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　Abstract
Using ａ two-period model where two levels of government co-occupy the same tax base, this
paper　analyzes the strategic incentive to debt/surplus policy induced by vertical fiscal com-
petition. Based on the anticipation of the second-period tax-setting game, the governments　set
their debt/surplus policies in the firstperiod. Within this framework, each government has an
incentive to use its debt/surplus policy in order to affect the second-period policy set by the
other level of government. As ａ result of this strategic behavior, vertical fiscal competition
creates ａ tendency towards public surplus. Ａ numerical calculation of the model shows that
strategic debt/surplus policy will lead to ａ lower welfare than when this policy is not avail-
able.
JEL Classification : H71 ； H72 ；Ｈ74
1 . Introduction
　In the literature on fiscal federalism, substantial attention has been devoted to the in-
fluences　of horizontal or vertical fiscal competition　on policy-making by governments. The
study of horizontal fiscal competition　analyzes competition among governments at the same
level, which is caused by mobility of tax bases, tax exporting, spillover　of　public　service
　　　　　　　　　　T）benefits and so forth.０ｎ the other hand, the study of vertical fiscal competition, which is this
paper's concern, typically focuses　on interactions between different levels of government due
to overlapping tax bases.　Since the seminal works of Johnson　(1982) and Flowers (1988),
several papers have　clarified the nature of equilibrium public policies under vertical fiscal
competition (e･ ｇ･，Dahlby (1996); Keen and Kotsogiannis (1996, 2003) ; Keen (1998) ; Wrede
（1996，2000）；Ｆｌｏｃｈｅｌand Madies （2002）；Dahlbｙ and Wilson （2003几The standard (but
not necessarily common) argument in the literature is that this competition will result in
inefficiently high tax rates. With tax bases　being overlapped, ａ tax increase made by one
level of government will decrease the co-occupied tax bases and create ａ negative externality
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2）on the other level of government.
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(1499)
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　Most of the studies of vertical fiscal competition have been limited to the analyses of
equilibrium public policies in single-period models. This paper intends to gain some insight
into vertical fiscal competition when public debt/surplus is available as　an additional　policy
instrument. As for horizontal fiscal competition, there have been　some　research papers that
analyze how allowing for debt/surplus policy influences policy-making by governments, (e･ ｇ･，
Jensen and Toma (1991); Bruce　(1995); Schultz and Siostrom (2001)；Ｋｒｏｇstｒｕｐ(2002)ﾚ)
Among these papers, my approach follows that of Jensen　and Toma in the sense　that it
focuses on the strategic use　of　debt/surplus　policy　inａ　subgame perfect equilibrium, rather
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　3)than debt玉nanced public policy in ａ growing economy. For this purpose, ｌ construct ａ simple
two-period model with two levels of government, where there is no　capital accumulation in
the production sector and neither public debt nor public surplus is needed in the second-best
optimum with distortionary taxation. Within this framework, this paper examines the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium in which, based on the anticipation of the second-period tax-
setting game, each level of government　sets　its　debt/surplus　policy　in the　first　period.
　To study the strategic policy-making induced by vertical fiscal competition, assuming that
debt/surplus policy is not initially available, the impact of introducing this policy is analyzed
in the first place. This analysis makes it clear that each level of government uses debt/
surplus　policy as　ａ　means of decreasing the second-period tax rate set by the other level of
government and expanding the common tax bases　in that period. Starting from ａ balanced-
budget equilibrium, governments engaging in vertical fiscal competition have　an incentive to
introduce public surplus (debt) if and only if their tax　rates　are strategic complements
(substitutes). In particular, it is shown that the condition for public　surplus, i.　ｅ･,strategic
complements, is met when consumption taxation is co-occupied and when the elasticity of the
demand for private goods is constant. This tendency towards public surplus basically carries
over　to the case　where debt/surplus policy is set according to the subgame prefect Nash
equilibrium conditions.　To demonstrate, this paper　conducts ａ numerical calculation of the
model. The outcomes show that both the levels of governments accumulate public surplus if
there is no large difference　of the welfare weights on the public goods provided by these
governments. Even if the difference　of the welfare weights is large, one level of government
chooses　surplus. Also, ａ welfare comparison is made between the second-best optimum and
the equilibrium where debt/surplus policy is prohibited or allowed for. Without debt/surplus
policy, as　the　previous　studies of vertical fiscal competition assert, excessive taxation　under
overlapping tax bases　causes　ａ　welfare loss relative to the second-best optimum. However,
strategic debt/surplus policy is not necessarily beneficial to residents because it may induce ａ
situation similar to prisoner's dilemma between governments. Indeed, in my numerical model,
allowing for debt/surplus policy results in ａ lower welfare than when ａ balanced-budget
　　　●　　　　　　　　　●　　●　　　　　　　　　　●　　　　　　　　　　　　●requirement IS imposed ｍ each period.
　This paper is organized as follows. The model and the equilibrium conditions for public
policies are, respectively, described in Sections 2 and 3. Section 4 1nvestigates the strategic
incentive to debt/surplus policy under vertical fiscal competition, and argues its welfare im-
plication. While my analysis in this paper focuses on　consumption taxation, Section 4 also
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(1500)
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refers to the case　of other taxation. Section 5 gives concluding remarks.
2. The Model
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　Consider an　economy with two periods and two levels of governments. For the sake of
convenience, these governments are, respectively, called the state and federal governments.
The economy is small open in the sense that residents and the governments face ａ　common
fixed interest rate. In each period, competitive丘rms produce　an output using labor. One unit
of labor produces one unit of the output, which can be transformed into one unit of a private
good, a state public good, or ａ federal public good. While the state and federal governments
impose taxes on private good consumption, they　can　also issue public debt or accumulate
public surplus to finance public expenditure in each period. To concentrate on the inefficiency
caused by strategic interaction between different levels of government through debt/surplus
policy, this paper employs several assumptions that simplify the analysis. There　are　no
intergovernmental transfers in the model. Following most of the studies in the fiscal federal-
ism literature, this paper assumes that there is no money creation by the federal government
and that state debt/surplus policy is not subject to federal regulation. In the present model,
any　source　of horizontal fiscal competition　such as population mobility, commuting across
states and cross-border shopping is excluded. Given this nature of the model, it is assumed
that there is only ａ single state in the economy. Any result in this paper carries over to the
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　4）case with a finite number of identical states.
　ｌ now turn to detailed description of the model. The utility function of ａ representative
resident　IS　quasi-linear:
訳φ(ぶ)－£汁み(よ)十召(Ｇﾊﾞ))， ∩）
where Xi is private good consumption in period i (subscript 1 0r 2, stands for the period.),
£/ is labor supply, and gi and Gi are, respectively, the supply of the state and federal public
goods. In what follows, lower-case　letters (capital　letters) denote the　policy　variables　ofthe
state (federal) government･篤φ，ｂ ａｌｎｄ召are　all concave　functions :が＞Ｏ＞ぜ≒（ｙ＞Ｏ＞
φへ　b’＞Ｏ＞b≒Ｂ’＞Ｏ＞召″.For the sake of brevity, it is assumed that the constant interest
rate is zero　and that there　is　no　discount factor of utility　in the second period. 口hese
assumptions are not crucial to this paper's arguments.) The private budget constraint in each
　　●　　　　●period ls:
Q1×1二£1－S
Q2X2 ―L2十Ｓ
(2a)
(2b)
where Qi is the consumer　price of Xi and S is private savings. The wage rate is normalized
to 1.（£いs chosen as the numeraire in the ｍｏｄｅ１∠）The price of the private good equals
　　　　仙＝１十む十乃，　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（３）
(1501)
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where ti and T/ are, respectively, the state and federal consumption tax rates. Using (2a, b），
total utilityis given by
訳φ(X1)－Q1×1－ Ｓ十が:g1)十召(G1))十訳φ(瓦)－Q2瓦－Ｓ十が:れ)十召(G2)) （４）
　Taking Ｑｏgi and Ｇ，as given, the representativeresident chooses　ぶand S to maximize
（4）.The first-orderconditions are
φ'(X) = 0,-
U＼ = U'2
（５）
（６）
Note that under the assumed quasi-linear　utility　function,the tax base　in period　i depends
only on the total tax rate in that period :
瓦＝Ｘ(仙)；ATj＝ 上
ぐ
＜0.
The state and federal budget constraints in the first period are, respectively,
　　　X1×1＋ｅ二g1；
　　　瓦X1十万＝G1.
（７）
(8a)
(8b)
where e and E stand for state and federal debt, respectively. (If e and E are　negative, the
governments　are　accumulating public surplus.) Similarly, the second-period　public　budget
constraints　are ：
t２×２－ ε二g2;
乃瓦一万＝Ｇ2
(9a)
(9b)
3 .　Equilibrium Conditions
　3.1. Second-best optimum
　Before examining the governments' strategic behavior, this subsection presents the second-
best conditions for public policies. Suppose that ａ unified government provides both gi and Ｇ，
by imposing consumption taxation. The unified government sets policy variables to maximize
total utility,( 4 ), subject to ｇ１十G1＝ｒ1×1十Eand, g2十G2＝ｒ2瓦－Eｗheｒｅ ｒ，is the unified tax
rate (Q, = l十榴）ａｎｄs is public debt. In the present model, the second-best optimum involves
neither debt nor surplus. To see　this, note　that　the　first-order　conditionsfor taxation　and
public　goods are
－Ｘ,十bi'iX,十Ｔ.Ｘ/)二Ｏ；
みj‾召j.
(10a)
(10b)
Eq. ( 5 ) was applied to derive (10a). Eq. (10a) corresponds to the familiar tax-financing rule
for public expenditure under distortionary taxation. Eq. (10b) implies that the marginal be-
nefits　of　both　the　public　goods are　equalized in the optimum. If the unified government
(1502)
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would have public debt/surplus as a policy instrument, it would be set such that bで= h2 (or,
equivalently, Bi=B2ブHowever, because　the tax base in period i depends only on the tax
rate in that period, (10a, b) effectively imply that the first-period tax and expenditure policies
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　5）are the same as those in the second period, showing that £ is a redundant policy instrument.
　3 。2 ．　Subsrame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
　In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the state and federal governments　strategically
set their policy variables. The standard backward induction procedure to obtain the equilib-
rium conditions　starts with examination of the second-period optimization made by these
governments. Given the first-period policy variables (^1, Tu gu Gu e and E) and S, each
government chooses　its second-period tax rate and public good supply to maximize the
second-period utility subject to (9a) or (9b). In this maximization, the other government's
second-period tax rate and public good supply are taken　as given. As for the state govern-
ment, the objective function is. 訳φ(瓦(Q2))－Q2瓦(Q2)十Ｓ十万(j2瓦(Q2)－○十召(G2)).Ｕsｉｎｇ
( 5 ), the first-order　condition folり2 1s
　　　ｚ(じt２、Ｔ２、ｅ)≡一瓦十町瓦十し¥y＝0.
Similarly、the first-order　condition for 71 set by the federal government is
　　　Ｚし2、Ｔ２、Ｅ)≡一瓦十召ご(瓦十八瓦つ＝0.
(11a)
[]∠Lb)
In (11a, b),∂ｚ/∂toand∂Ｚ/∂To must be negative to satisfy the second-order　conditionfor
optimization.It is assumed that,given e and E, (9a, b) and (11a, b) have ａ stable solution.
The resultant tax rates　aregiven by
t２＝t2(ら£)；
T2=T2(e, E)
(12a)
(12b)
　In the firstperiod, the governments take the second-period tax functions,(12a, b), into
account in their policy-making. Denoting the maximized second-period utility　atａ　given
amount of e, E and Ｓ by 軟ら£，Ｓ)，theutilitycan be expressed as
　　　　訳φ(X1)－Q1×1－ S十h(.gi)十召(G1))十幄ら£，S).　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(13)
Each government chooses　its　first-period　tax　rate, public　good　sｕpplｙ　and　the amount of
public debt/surplus to maximize (13) subject to (8a) or (8b). Similar to the second-period
optimization, the other government's policy variables are taken as given. In choosing the level
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　6)ofらthe state government considers the impact on its own tax revenue in the second period :
∂皆∂e＝一心配(1十瓦∂TJde) (14a)
Similarly,in the optimization made by the federal government, the impact of £ｏｎ Ｆ is
relevant:
∂皆∂£＝一吻沼2て１十瓦∂X2/∂£)；
(1503)
(14b)
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Note, from ( 6 ), that －zが十∂皆∂S二O since ∂幄∂Ｓ＝屁. This means that although private
savings, 5, is affected by policy changes, the policy-induced changes in Ｓ do not appear in the
first-order conditions for policy variables. Using ( 5 ), the first-order conditions for tiland Ti
are, respectively,
　　　－X1十配（X1十t､X1つ二Ｏ；
　　　－Ｘ１十召i'(X十八Ｘム）＝0.
The first-order　conditionsfor ｅ and E are derived by using（1仏b) and ( 6 )
み1－好一好瓦∂71/み＝０
召1－Ｂ．’- ＢｏＸ？∂X2/∂£＝0.
(1
(1
5ａ）
5b）
(16a)
(16b)
Throughout this paper, (13) is assumed to be concave　with respect to the 丘rst-period policy
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　7）variables, so that the second-order conditions for optimization hold.
　Eqs. (11a, b) and (15a, b) represent the tax-financing rule　for public　expenditure　in each
period. Ens. (16a, b) are the conditions that determine inter-temporal allocation of tax re-
venue　through debt/surplus policy. In the present model where the governments set their
first-period policies according to the anticipation of the tax-setting game in the second period,
the key determinant of strategic debt/surplus policy is the impact of e and E on the second-
period tax rates,∂Tolde and.∂ら/∂E. In the next section, the incentive to debt/surplus policy
and the nature of the second-period tax functions　are　examined in detail.
4 ．　Public Policy
　4.1. The Impact of Introducing" Public Debt/surplus
　To obtain ａ theoretical insight into the strategic incentive　to　debt / surplus　policy, it　is
helpful to investigate the impact of introducing this policy. Suppose that g and E are initially
constrained to be zero. In this balanced-budget equilibrium, the state and federal governments
will simply set their tax rates according to (11a, b) and (15a, bﾔStarting from this equilib-
rium, consider that the governments are allowed to introduce public debt or surplus by ａ
small arnount. If, tａｋｉｎｇＥ＝Oas given, the LHS of (16a) is positive (negative) in this
equilibrium, the state government has　an incentive to introduce debt (surplus). Similarly, if
the　LHS　of (16b) is　positive (negative), the　federal　government　will　introduce　debt
(surplus). In the balanced-budget equilibrium, this incentive to introduce debt or surplus can
directly be related to the sign of the derivatives of the second-period tax functions.
Fｒｏｐｏｓitｉｏｎ ｌ．
が∂7ソ∂ｅ ａｎｄ∂X2/∂Ｅ ａｒｅ ｐｏｓiｔiｖｅ　Vﾚｎｅｇａｔｉｖｅ），　tｈｅｇｏｖｅｒｎｍｅｎtｓ　ha゛ｖｅ ａｎ　ｉｎｃｅｎｔiｖｅ ｔｏ ｉｎｔｒｏｄｕｃｅ
♪縦走ｃ　ｓｕｒ恒心（心加）緬　伍ｅ　ｈａｌａｎｃｐ.ｄ一bｕｄｇｅt ｅｑｕilihｒiｕｍ.
(1504)
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Pｒｏｏｆ.Ｅqsづ11a,b) and (15a, b) imply that, without debt/surplus policy, the second-period
equilibrium is ａ　replica of the first-period one （g1＝ｇ９ぺG1二G2バ1二t2＼ Ti = T2)y because　瓦
depends only on the tax rate in that period. Thus, みドニみjand 召ドニ召j hold, implying that
the welfare impact of introducing debt/surplus policy is given by the second term on the
LHS of (16a, b) Q.E.D
　The intuition behind this proposition is straightforward. Under vertical fiscal competition, ａ
tax increase made by one level of government decreases the common tax base　and the tax
revenue　of the other level of government. Anticipating this game structure, each government
strategically introduces　debt/surplus　policy　in　the　first　period　to　decrease　thesecond-period
tax rate　set by the　other level　of government　and　to　expand　its own　tax　revenue. For
example, if∂た/∂£＞O then the federal government attempts to induce the state government
to decrease X2 by introducing public surplus. This increases the federal tax revenue, T2X2, at a
　　　　9）given T2.
　The terms, ∂Ｔ２Ｚ∂e,and∂ち/∂E, can be derived from comparative statics of the second-
period equilibrium conditions, (11a, b):
∂か∂む 一一
＆2/∂£＝
(∂Ｚ/∂じ)(∂ｚ/紬
　　　£一
(∂ｚ/∂か(∂Ｚ/∂£)
　　　£?
(17a)
(17b)
where.£?＝(∂ｚ/∂た)(∂Ｚ/∂71)－(∂ｚ/∂7レ:∂Ｚ/∂t2).Stability of the second-period equilibrium im-
plies that ･Ｑ＞O. The sign of ∂ｚ/∂eand ∂Ｚ/∂E are easily identified :
?＝?
???
（．?
一回(瓦十x2瓦つ＝
一万2″瓦
　町
∂Ｚ/∂£＝一召2″(瓦十八瓦つ＝
＞Ｏ;
一召2″瓦
召ご
＞0.
(18a)
(18b)
In deriving these　equations, the　second equality of (11a, b) was used. From (17a, b) and
(18a, b), the sign of ∂た/∂E and∂瓦/∂白depends on that of ∂Ｚ/∂toand∂ｚ/∂T2. This sign, in
turn, depends　on the　slope　of the second-period reaction functions　of the state and federal
governments in the (ﾚh，　Ｔ．)plane, which are, respectively, given by
dｕｌｄＴ．＝－
dＴｊｄｋｏ＝－
∂ｚ/∂71
∂ｚ/∂X2
∂Ｚ/∂ら
∂ｚ/∂7ｙ
(19a)
(19b)
Figure l　describes the case　where the tax　rates　are strategic complements. In this case,
∂T21de and∂ら/∂E are positive because　∂Ｚ/∂toand∂ｚ/∂To are positive, so that Proposition l
implies that the governments have　an incentive to introduce public surplus in the balanced-
budget equilibrium.
　To see the relationship between the incentive for debt/surplus policy and the nature of the
(1505)
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　　　　　　　　　　　　　Figure　1
second-period tax or reaction functions, it may be useful to make ａ comparison between the
present analysis and Jensen and Toma (1991), where governments at the same level, compet-
ing for mobile tax bases, strategically issue public debt or accumulate public surplus. In both
of these studies, an increase in ａ government's debt increases the second-period tax rates set
by other governments if the tax rates are strategic complements in the second period. Howev-
er, Jensen　and Toma (see their Propositions l and 4）shoｗ that, in this case, governments
introduce public debt, rather than public surplus, in the balanced-budget equilibrium. This
difference　occurs because, under horizontal fiscal competition, each government attempts to
increase other governments' second-period tax rates in order to attract mobile tax bases.　０ｎ
the contrary, as was discussed with respect to Proposition 1，vertical fiscal competition due to
overlapping tax bases　gives each government an incentive to decrease the tax rate set by
other level of government, thereby generating the opposite incentive to　debt/surplus　policy｡
　In the present analysis, the slope of the second-period reaction functions is generally ambi-
guous even in the neighborhood of the balanced-budget equilibrium. Interestingly, however, a
clear result is obtained when the price elasticity of the demand for the private good is
constant. In this case, as described in Fig. 1，the tax　rates　are strategic complements in the
balanced-budget equilibrium.
Pｒｏｐｏｓitｉｏｎ ２.
UT、ｓtａｒtｉｎｏ:升ｏｍ　the　ｂａｌａｎｃｅｄ一bｕｄｇｅt ｅｑｔ?ihｒiｕｍ、ａ ｓｍａｌｌ ａｍｏｕｎt　ｏｆ ｐｕblic　ｄｅｂt　ｏｒ　ｓｕｒplｕｓ
iｓ alloｖｏｅｄ、ｂｏ峨峨ｅ ｌｅ゛ｖelｓ ｏｆ ｇｏで)ｅｒｎｍｅｎt 　ha゛ｖｅ　ａｎ　ｉｎｃｅｎtiｖｅ　tｏ　ｉｎtｒｏｄｕｃｅ　ｊ）縦走ｃ　ｓｕｒplｕｓ
ｘｖｈｅｎ　the ｐｒｉｃｅ ｅｌａｓticiりｏｆ ｄｅｍａｎｄ ｉｓ ｃｏｎｓtａｎt.
Pｒｏｏｆ.Denote the elasticity by η＝－(ｘｊＱう/X. The first-order　conditions for the second-
period tax rates, (11a, b), can be rewritten as
(1506)
ち
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Z2＝0
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Z2＝0
0　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　乃
(1507)
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z(ﾚt２、Ｔ２、ｅう二 配 (1
z(ﾚt２、Ｔ２、Ｅ)＝Ｂj
?
lfη　is constant one has
∂ｚ/∂71＝
∂Ｚ/∂X2＝
１－
亙
Q2
万
一
Q2
???
????
η＜１－
㎜
１－
好
一
Q2
召ご
一
Q2
η；
亙
Q2
?? ?
?? ?
－
?????
１ 一
一
－１
? ? ?
????
Ｏ；
一
一
０
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(20a)
(20b)
(21a)
(21b)
(22a)
万
一
Q2
み
2
″
一
町
B２″
召j
The second equality of （20a，b）ｗａs applied to derive (21a,にBecause　the parenthesized
terms of (21a, b) are positive, the sign of ∂Zldt2 and ∂ｚ/∂71 1s the same　as that of the
second-period tax rates. This implies, from (17a, bレthat sign ∂71/み＝sign X2 and sign ∂X2/∂£
二sｉｇｎらｕｎｄｅｒthe constant elasticity assumption. Note that the tax rates must be positive in
the balanced-budget equilibrium as long as the public goods are　supplied. Thus, ∂T21de and
∂X2/∂E must be positive in this equilibrium. This result, together with Proposition 1， com-
pletes the proof.　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Q. E. D.
　4 ｡ 2 .　Strateg'ic Debt/surplus Policy in the Subsrame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
　Suppose　now that there are no constraints on debt/surplus policy, so that ｅ and Ｅ are
chosen according to (16a, b). As ｌｏｎｇas ∂t2Z∂E and∂乃/∂c are non-zero, debt/surplus policy
will be used in the equilibrium, affecting the relative magnitude of the tax rates and expendi-
ture levels in each period. It is easy to see, from (16a, b), that the relative magnitude of
public good supply in each period depends on the sign of ∂T21de and∂た/∂E. For example, if
∂石/∂E and∂x2/∂E are positive then 配＞配ａｎｄ，召j＞召ムimplｙｉｎｇthat gj＜ｇｊ and Ｇｊ＜Ｇｊ
because the marginal utilitiesare diminishing. When, as in Proposition 2，the price elasticity
of demand is assumed to be constant, the whole structure of tax and expenditure policies can
clearly be　identified.
Pｒｏｐｏｓitｉｏｎ３.
1n the ｓｕｈｇａｍｅ ｐｅｒｆｅｃtNash eｑｕilihｒiｕｍ，　the ＾ｒｓｔ-ｐｅｒｉｏｄ　証エｒａtｅｓａｒe　higheｒ　tｈａｎ　the
ｓｅｃｏｎｄ-ｐｅｒｉｏｄｏｎｅｓｘｖhile pｕblic eｘｐｅｎｄｉtｕｒｅｓａｒe higheｒ　in　the　ｓｅｃｏｎｄ　ｐｅｒｉｏｄ　if∂Ｔ２Ｚ∂ｅａｎｄ
街2/∂Ｅ ａｒｅ ｐｏｓitiｖｅａｎｄ ｉｆ　the ｐｒｉｃｅｅｌａｓticiりｏｆ ｄｅｍａｎｄ ｉｓｃｏｎｓtａｎt．
Pｒｏｏｆ.Because the nature of expenditure policy has already been discussed, the proof is
made with respect to tax policy. The fact that 配＞配ａｎｄ召ﾊﾞ＞召ご when ∂Ｔ２Ｚ∂Eand∂X2/∂£
are positive means that the marginal cost of public funds is higher in the first period. Under
the constant elasticity assumption, the first-order conditions for the tax rates, (20a, b) and
similar equations in the first period, imply that
互
Q1
亙
Q2
一
一
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η， (22b)
which immediately show that 乙1/Q1 >ul Q2 and 71/ Q1 ＞71/ Q2. Summing these inequalities
giｖｅs(玉十八)/Q1(:た十T2)/Q2, which, in turn, means that Oi>Q2. Recalling, from the proof of
Proposition 2，that the second-period tax rates must be positive when ∂T21de and∂ら/∂E are
positive under the constant elasticity assumption (that is, sign∂八/み＝sign 71 and sign
∂x2/∂£＝sｉｇｎx2)，itfollows that tl/t2>Ql/Q2>l and Ｔ１ＺＴ２＞Q1/Q2＞1.　　　　　　Q. E. D.
　In the present model, there　are other possible types of equilibrium where　either∂Ｔ２Ｚ∂eor
∂た/∂£is negative:note that ∂T21de and∂j2/∂E cannot simultaneously be non-positive under
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　TO）the constant elasticity assumption. In this case, either To or to must be negative, implying that
at least one level of government will accumulate public surplus in the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. Proposition 3 suggests that when all the tax rates are positive, there will also be
ａ tendency towards public surplus because　the tax rates are higher　and public expenditures
are lower in the firstperiod. However, the precise nature of equilibrium debt/surplus policy
cannot theoretically be proven in the present model where the policies set by different levels
of government interact through an overlapping tax base.　Therefore, the rest of my analysis
depends　on　ａ　numerical calculation of the model.
　In what follows, the utility function is specified such that ｇ二
Suppose that φし（）tａｋｅsthe form
φ(瓦)＝
AX'~･jｼ‾
１一生’
　η
φ(ぶ)－£汁み(涵)十召(Ｇﾊﾞ)
(23)
where Ａ is positive and constant. The functions, が:れ)ａｎｄ召(Ｇ汪are･ respectively･ spe?led
as follows :
け√示‾;
瓦二α√む‾ﾑ
(24a)
(24b)
　　山
where a is the relative welfare weight on the federal public good to the state public good.
With these　sｐｅ?ications　ofthe functions, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, consisting
of (8a, b), (9a, b), (11a, b), (15a, b) and (16a, b), was calculated. Under the assumptions
that y1二3 and η二1.5, Table l summarizes equilibrium policy policies and residents' welfare
within the range ｏｆα∈[0.5, 2], which satisfy the usual stability condition for the Nash
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　].2)equilibrium in both the periods.
　First of all,see the case　with a二1, where the state and federal public goods are　effectively
identical from the viewpoint of residents, so that ａ symmetric equilibrium occurs　where both
the levels of governments set the same policy. In this simplest case, the second-period tax
rates are positive and public surplus is chosen　し2＝乃＝0.03312ノ＝£＝－0.07093).Ｅｖen if
α≠1, these natures of public policy hold as ｌｏｎｇas the difference　of the welfare weights on
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(1508)
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y1二３；η二１．５
　　α　　　　　　0.5　　　　　0.6　　　　　0.7　　　　　0.8　　　　　0.9　　　　　　1　　　　　　1.1　　　　　1.2
　　f1　　　　0.04205　　0.04559　　0.04967　　0.05423　　0.05923　　0.06463　　0.07039　　0.07647
　　乃　　　　0.0369　　0.04092　　0.04569　　0.05124　　0.05755　　0.06463　　0.07247　　0.08107
X1十乃　　　0.07895　　0.08651　　0.09536　　0.10547　　0.11678　　0.12926　　0.14286　　0.15754
　　ち　　　　0.04939　　0.04673　　0.04372　　0.04042　　0.03687　　0.03312　　0.02922　　0.02522
　　石　　　－0.01029　－0.00343　　0.004肘　　0.01322　　0.02281　　0.03312　　0.04405　　0.05552
X2十石　　　0.0391　　　0.0433　　0.04816　　0.05364　　0.05968　　0.06624　　0.07327　　0.08074
　　91　　　　0.22163　　0.21952　　0.2↓715　　0.2↓456　　0.21↓81　　0.20892　　0.20594　　0.20291
　　G1　　　　　0.05625　　0.08012　　0.10765　　0.13853　　0.1724　　　0.20892　　0.24769　　0.28834
91十G1　　　0.27788　　0.29964　　0.3248　　　0.35309　　0.38421　　0.41784　　0.45363　　0.49125
　　92　　　　　　　　0.21562　　　　0.21753　　　　0.21969　　　　0.2221　　　　　0.22459　　　　0.22725　　　　0.23　　　　　　　0.2328
　　G2　　　　　0.06437　　　0.09809　　　0.12095　　　0.15404　　　0.18963　　　0.22725　　　0.2664　　　0.30666
92十G2　　　0.27999　　0.31562　　0.34064　　0.37614　　0.41422　　0.4545　　　0.4964　　　0.53946
　　召　　　　　0.02668　　0.01034　－0.00797　－0.02787　-0.04897　－0.07093　－0.09342　－0.116↓6
　　£　　　　-0.11483　－0.10762　-0.09947　－0.09054　－0.08098　－0.07093　－0.06053　-0.04989
∂71/∂e　　－0.00278　－0.00093　　0.00121　　0.0036　　0.00624　　0.0091　　0.01215　　0.01538
∂t２ﾉ∂£　　0.01421　0.01335　0.01239　0.01134　0.01024　0.0091　　0.00793　0.00676
Welfaｒe　　6.53916　　6.54675　　6.55564　　6.56577　　6.5771　　6.58959　　6.60317　　6.61781
　　α　　　　　　1.3　　　　　1.4　　　　　1.5　　　　　1.6　　　　　1.7　　　　　1.8　　　　　1.9　　　　　　2
　　f1　　　　0.08284　　0.08948　　0.09635　　0.10343　　0.1107　　0.11818　　0.12581　　0.13359
　　八　　　　0.0904　　0.10044　　0.11119　　0.1226　　0.13467　　0.14735　　0.16062　　0.17446
　j1十八　　　0.17324　　0.18992　　0.20754　　0.22603　　0.24537　　0.26553　　0.28643　　0.30805
　　ち　　　　0.02115　　0.01704　　0.01292　　0.00881　　0.00474　　0.00071　－0.00325　－0.00714
　　八　　　　0.06743　　0.07972　　0.09231　　0.10515　　0.11817　　0.13133　　0.14459　　0.15791
　X2十八　　　0.08858　　0.09676　　0.10523　　0.11396　　0.12291　　0.13204　　0.14134　　0.15077
　　91　　　　　　　　0. 19985　　　　0. 19678　　　　0. 19374　　　　0. 19073　　　　0. 18777　　　　0 ｡ 18487　　　　0 ｡ 18203　　　　0 ∠17927
　　G1　　　　　0.33049　　0.37377　　0.41785　　0.4624　　　0.50713　　0.55178　　0.5961　　　0.63991
91十G1　　　0.53034　　0.57055　　0.61159　　0.65313　　0.6949　　　0.73665　　0.77813　　0.81918
　　92　　　　　　　　0.23564　　　　0.23849　　　　0.24131　　　　0.24411　　　　0.24685　　　　0.24953　　　　0.25214　　　　0.25468
　　G2　　　　　0.34763　　　0.38897　　　0.43038　　　0.4716　　　0.5124　　　0.55261　　　0.59209　　　0.63071
92十G2　　　0.58327　　0.62746　　0.67169　　0.71571　　0.75925　　0.80214　　0.84423　　0.88539
　　召　　　　－0.13889　－0.16142　－0.18356　－0.20518　-0.22617　-0.24646　－0.266　　-0.28473
　　£　　　　－0.03913　－0.02832　－0.0↓755　－0.00688　　0.00364　　0.01398　　0.02409　　0.03396
∂Ｔ２Ｚ∂E　　　0.01877　　0.0223　　0.0259　　0.02971　　0.03357　　0.0375　　0.04152　　0.04559
∂ち/∂£　　　0.0056　　　0.00445　　0.00333　　0.00223　　0.00119　　0.00018　－0.00079　－0.00171
耳賀か9　　6.63343　　6.65　　　6.66745　　6.68573　　6.70479　　6.72459　　6.74506　　6.76617
gi and Gi is not large； see the cases　whereα∈[0.7, 1.]dｻ|.０ｎthe other hand, ａsαΓises or
falls　further,one　level　of　government starts issuing debt while the other stillchooses　public
surplus. For α二0.5 and a二0.6, in which cases the welfare weight on the federal public good
is relatively low, the federal tax is negative in the second period and the state government
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(1509)
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issues debt. ０ｎ the contrary, if this welfare weight is high, federal debt is issued ； see the
cases　with a二1.7～2. Note that, except for the cases　withα二1.7 andα二1.8, the sign of
∂T21de and∂ら/∂£is correlated to the choice of debt or surplus in the manner　argued in
Section 4.1 (see Proposition 1). That is, surplus (debt) is chosen when ａ marginal increase
in debt increases　(decreases) the second-period tax rate set by the other level of government.
Note also that, in the present numerical model, there is ａ rnonotonous correlation between the
marginal impact of debt/surplus on the second-period tax rates and the amount of surplus.
ＡsαΓises, state surplus and ∂万/∂e increase　while federal surplus and ∂た/∂E decrease.　These
changes in public surplus affect equilibrium tax and expenditure policies. Ａ rise in α, by
increasing state surplus, causes　f1（j2）tｏrise (fall) while decreasing ｇ１(increasingが）.０ｎ
the other hand, Ti and Gi are increased in both the periods as ａ result of ａ rise in a, because
the evaluation of the federal public good increases.
　To examine how public debt/surplus policy influences　welfare, Tables 2 and 3 present the
outcomes　of the numerical calculations　of the second-best optimum and the balanced-budget
equilibrium under the assumption that A = 3 and η二1.5. As will be expected, inefficiently
high tax rates and public expenditures due to vertical fiscal competition lead to ａ lower
welfare in the balanced-budget equilibrium than in the second-best optimum. 0f particular
interest is that, for each α，the welfare is lower in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
than in the balanced-budget one. At ａ glance, this goes　against the arguments in Section 4 .1
where, in the neighborhood of the balanced-budget equilibrium, the governments have　an
incentive to introduce surplus in order to improve welfare. Although this“local”analysis was
helpful to identify the strategic incentive to debt/surplus policy, it does not necessarily give ａ
clear insight into ａ“discrete” comparison of the welfare obtained from different types of
equilibrium. In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, debt/surplus policy causes　ａsituation
similar to prisoner's dilemma by distorting tax policy significantly. Tables 1－3 show that,
regardless of the value of a, the ranking of the total tax rate is that 八十万＞f＋７＞ｒ＞た十万，
where ti十Ti and f＋７ are, respectively, the total tax rate in the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium and the balanced-budget one. Thus, debt/surplus policy makes excessive taxation
more serious in the firstperiod while the total tax rate is too low in the second period. ０ｎ
the other hand, oversupply of the public goods stillpersists. Tables l and 2 show that, for
each a, both the state and federal public good levels are too high in the subgame perfect
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　15）Nash equilibrium relative to the second-best optimum. Given that expenditure distortion　re-
mains, the tax distortion induced by debt/surplus policy creates ａ large difference　of private
consumption and utilitybetween both the periods, requiring that private savings is adjusted to
ｋｅｅｐthe equality of the marginal utility of the first-period and second-period consumption
(see ( 6几　Given that utility　isconcave　and that private consumption will be quite low in
the first period, this adjustment will lead to ａ lower total utility･
　The main results based on the numerical calculations　are　summarized in the following
　　　　●　●proposition :
(1510)
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　　　　　　　　　　　Table ２　Second-best optimum
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y1二３；η二１．５
　　α　　　　　　0.5　　　　　0.6　　　　　0.7　　　　　0.8　　　　　0.9　　　　　　1　　　　　　1.1　　　　　1.2
　　ｒ　　　　　　　　0.05535　　　　0.05981　　　　0.06502　　　　0.07093　　　　0.07752　　　　0.08473　　　　0.09253　　　　0.10088
　　9　　　　　　　　0 ｡ 21221　　　　0 ｡ 20946　　　　0 ｡ 20631　　　　0 ｡ 20279　　　　0 ｡ 19896　　　　0 ｡ 19485　　　　0 ｡ 19051　　　　0 ｡ 186
　　G　　　　0.05305　　0.075肘　　0.10109　　0.12979　　0.16116　　0.19485　　0.23052　　0.26783
　g十G　　　　0.26526　　0.28487　　0.3074　　　0.33258　　0.36012　　0.3897　　　0.42103　　0.45383
Uﾝ ｅ＾ｌｆａｒe　　6.53971　　6.54743　　6.55648　　6.56682　　6.57841　　6.59121　　6.60518　　6.62027
　　α　　　　　　1.3　　　　　1.4　　　　　1.5　　　　　1.6　　　　　1.7　　　　　1.8　　　　　1.9　　　　　　2
　　7･　　　　　　　　0.10974　　　　0.11907　　　　0.12882　　　　0.13896　　　　0.14945　　　　0.16025　　　　0.17133　　　　0.18265
　　9　　　　　0. 18133　　0. 17657　　0. 17173　　0. 16687　　0. 16199　　0 ｡15714　　0 ｡15233　　0 ｡14759
　　G　　　　0.30645　　0.34607　　0.3864　　　0.42718　　0.46816　　0.50914　　0.54992　　0.59035
　g十G　　　0.48778　　0.52264　　0.55813　　0.59405　　0.63015　　0.66628　　0.70225　　0.73794
Welfaｒe　　6.63643　　6.65362　　6.67178　　6.69087　　6.71084　　6.73164　　6.75323　　6.77555
Table ３　Balanced-budget equilibrium
y1二３；η二１．５
　　α　　　　　　０．５　　　　　０．６　　　　　０．７　　　　　０．８　　　　　０．９　　　　　　１　　　　　　１．１　　　　　１．２
　　乙　　　　　　　　0.04581　　　　0.04617　　　　0.04659　　　　0.04707　　　　0.0476　　　　　0.04819　　　　0.04883　　　　0.04951
　　7｀　　　　　　　　0.01263　　　　0.01806　　　　0.02438　　　　0.03153　　　　0.03949　　　　0.04819　　　　0.05759　　　　0.06762
　f＋7　　　　0.05844　　0.06423　　0.07097　　0.0786　　　0.08709　　0.09638　　0.10642　　0.117↓3
　　9　　　　　　　　0.21859　　　　0.21852　　　　0.21844　　　　0.21834　　　　0.21824　　　　0.21812　　　　0.218　　　　　　0.21787
　　G　　　　　　　　0.06028　　　　0.08548　　　　0.11428　　　　0.14627　　　　0.18103　　　　0.21812　　　　0.25711　　　　0.29759
　g十G　　　0.27887　　0.304　　　0.33272　　0.36461　　0.39927　　0.43624　　0.47511　　0.51546
耳賀か9　　6.53961　　6.54727　　6.55625　　6.56649　　6.57797　　6.59063　　6.60422　　6.6193
　　α　　　　　　1.3　　　　　1.4　　　　　1.5　　　　　1.6　　　　　1.7　　　　　1.8　　　　　1.9　　　　　　2
　　f　　　　　　　　0.05023　　　　0.051　　　　　　0.0518　　　　　0.05264　　　　0.05351　　　　0.0544　　　　　0.05533　　　　0.05628
　　7　　　　　　　　0.07825　　　　0.08942　　　　0.10108　　　　0.11317　　　　0.12567　　　　0.13852　　　　0.15167　　　　0.16511
　乙＋７｀　　　　0.12848　　0.14042　　0.15288　　0.16581　　0.17918　　0.19292　　0.207　　　　0.22139
　　9　　　　0.21773　　0.21759　　0.21744　　0.21728　　0.21713　　0.21697　　0.2168　　　0.21664
　　G　　　　　　　　0.33918　　　　0.38↓52　　　　0.42428　　　　0.46718　　　　0.50997　　　　0.55241　　　　0.59434　　　　0.63558
　g十G　　　　0.55691　　0.59911　　0.64172　　0.68446　　0.7271　　　0.76938　　0.8]』-14　　0.85222
Welfaｒe　　6.63522　　6.65213　　6.66997　　6.6887　　6.70827　　6.72862　　6.74972　　6.77151
Fｒｏｐｏｓitioｙ卜4.
耳語ｅｒe iｓ ｎｏ ｌａｒｇｅ 山がｅｒｅｎｃｅ　of the　ｖｏｅｌｆａｒｅ ｖｏｅｉｇｈｔｓｏｎ ｔhe ｓtａtｅ ａｎｄ　ｆｅｄｅｒal ｐ縦走ｃ goods、
both the leｖelｓ ｏｆ ｇｏでｅｒｎｍｅｎt　ｃｈｏｏｓｅ　ｐｕblic　ｓｕｒplｕｓ　in　the ｓｕｈｇａｍｅ ｐｅｒｆｅｃt １＼?ｓh eｑｔ?油一
ｎｕｍ. If this山ffeｒｅｎｃｅ　ｉｓ laｒｇｅ、 ｏｎｅ ｌｅ゛ｖｅｌｏｆ ｇｏｖｅｒｎｍｅｎｔ ｃｈｏｏｓｅｓ　ｓｕｒplｕｓ　ｘｖhile　ｔhe　ｏthe「
iｓｓｕｅｓｄｅｂt. Ａｓ ａ ｒｅｓｕlt ｏｆ thiｓ ｓtｒａtｅｇｉｃ ｐｏｌｉｃｙ-ｍａｋｉｎｇ、the　ｘｖｅびａｒｅ ｏｆ ｒｅｓｉｄｅｎtｓ ｂｅｃｏｍｅｓ loxｖｅｒ
tｈａｎ　ｔhat obtａｉｎｅｄ　ｘｖｈｅｎ ｄｅｂt／ｓｕｒplｕｓ ｐｏｌｉｃｙ iｓ ｎｏt ａｖailable．
(1511)
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As for the matter of whether debt or surplus is chosen, Proposition 4 1s in contrast to the
numerical example of Jensen　and Toma (1991), where horizontal fiscal competition induces
governments to issue debt in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. As was discussed in
Section 4 ｡1, this contrast can be explained by nothing that the opposite incentives　to　debt/
surplus policy arise from horizontal and vertical fiscal competition. Thus, the result that there
is an incentive to choose　public surplus under vertical fiscal competition is interesting but not
necessarily surprising. Rather, ａ more important implication of the present analysis might be
that allowing for debt/surplus policy results in ａ welfare loss, which is consistent with the
Tensen-Toma numerical analysis of horizontal fiscal competition. Both of these　studies suggest
that strategic debt/surplus policy will not mitigate the inefficiency caused by intergovernmen-
tal competition. Although the choice of debt or surplus itself may change if the present
analysis is extended to take horizontal fiscal competition into account, this extension will not
alter the welfare implication　as long as either debt or surplus is strategically deployed.
　4.3. Other Taxation
　This paper has assumed that the co-occupied tax base is private consumption. But, Proposi-
tion l will apply to the case　of other taxation. The strategic incentive to debt/surplus policy
generally depends on whether the tax rates　are　strategiccomplements or substitutes. ０ｎ the
other hand, in the case　of consumption taxation, the slope of the second-period reaction
functions is closely related to the sign of the tax rates when the price elasticity of demand is
constant. This nature was used to analyze whether debt or surplus is chosen in the balanced-
budget equilibrium (Proposition 2) and examine the tax structure in the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium (Proposition 3). Unfortunately, these propositions do not necessarily carry
over to　the case　of other taxation. For example, suppose that different levels　of　government
co-occupy labor taxation. In this case, the slope of the second-period reaction functions is no
longer correlated to the sign of the tax rates in that period even　if the elasticity of labor
supply　is assumed to be constant. As ａ result, the analysis becomes　considerably more　com-
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　16）plex even in the neighborhood of the balanced-budget equilibrium.
　Despite this difference　between consumption　and labor taxation, the nature of equilibrium
debt/surplus policy and its welfare implication, which were discussed in Proposition 4，appear
to be robust. To verify this,ｌ constructed ａ numerical model of labor taxation. In that model,
like ( 1 ), the utility function was　assumed to be additively separable :
Ui= V
娠拉）
瓦一如:瓦)十が:拓)十召(胤)
一
一
肛贈
(25)
(26)
　　　　　　　1＋'‘
　　　　　　　　　γ
(Ａs in Footnote 17，7 stands for the elasticity of labor　supplyﾚ)Ｔｈｅ specifications　of b(gi)
ａｎｄ召(Ｇﾊﾞ)functions are the same　as (24a, b). Other aspects of the model are quite similar to
those in the case　of consumption taxation. With these　sｐｅ?ications, setting y1二0.2, my
calculations　were　conducted with respect to γ∈[0.1，0.51.(Ｔｈｅ detailed model and the
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(1512)
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calculated outcomes are available upon　request.) In these calculations, for each r, the sym-
metry case　（α≠1) shows that the tax rates are strategic complements in the balanced-budget
equilibrium, and that the governments accumulate public surplus in the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. Even if α≠1, at least one level of government　chooses　public　surplus　in　the
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　17）subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the welfare is lower in the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium than in the balanced-budget one, implying that strategic debt/surplus policy
has ａ harmful welfare impact
﹇??
Concluding Remarks
　The previous　studies of vertical fiscal competition have mainly used single-period models
and analyzed how inefficient tax and expenditure policies occur　because　of overlapping tax
bases, or how fiscal arrangements are developed to overcome these inefficiencies.This paper
has incorporated strategic debt/surplus policy into ａ two-period model of vertical fiscal com-
petition, and demonstrated that this competition creates ａ tendency towards public surplus
and　causes　ａ　welfare loss. ０ｆ course, it should be emphasized that these　are the results of
abstracting other microeconomic or　macroeconomic aspects of debt-financed　public　policy
such　as　capital accumulation　and governments' investment on durable public services. Given
that the public sector in many countries suffers from persistent deficits,the incentive to use
public surplus induced by vertical fiscal competition may have quite different welfare implica-
tions　once these aspects are taken into account. There will be other important directions for
the future research. For example, this paper's analysis depends on the concept of subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium under which different governments set their policies simultaneously･
But, the previous studies of vertical fiscal competition (with single-period models) include the
analyses based on the Stackelberg equilibrium concept, as well as the Nash equilibrium
concept. To obtain ａ further insight into debt/surplus policy in the context of fiscal　federal-
ism, the dynamic approaches based on more sophisticated equilibrium concepts will be useful.
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Notes
↓) See Wilson (1999) and Wellisch （2000）foｒ comprehensive serveys of related studies.
2）This argument has been derived from models with revenue-maximizing governments, as well as
　benevolent governments. Throughout this paper, in order to examine the welfare implication of
　strategic　debt/surplus　policy, it　isassumed that all governments set public policies to maximize
　the welfare of residents.
3) This paper does not address the　policy issues　related to　persistent deficits　inthe　public　sector.
　Wenzel and Wrede (1996) analyze the existence and stability of equilibrium when governments at
　different levels accumulate public capital and issue public debt in a growing economy. However,
　they do not consider how^ governments, engaging in vertical fiscal competition, strategically set
　their　policies.
4）The presence of many small states will not be compatible with the present analysis of the
　subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, where the governments consider the impact of their first-
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　(1513)
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　　period policies on the second-period equilibrium. Except for this case, the absence　of　horizontal
　　fiscal competition means　that the number of states is largely irrelevant to the analysis. Even if
　　there are a finite number of identical states, the qualitative arguments in Section 4 .1 (Propositions
　　l and 2）ｄｏnot change at all, but the numerical model in Section 4.2 must slightly be modified
　　(see Footnote　12).
　5) It should be noted that this nature of the optimum is not because the interest rate is set equal
　　to　zero　and discounting is　ignored. Rather, it is because　the utility function is assumed to be
　　separable. In particular, it can be shown that the outcome involving E二O is the sole possible
　　second-best allocation if the price elasticity of the demand for the private good is constant.
　6) Derivation of（↓4a). Noting that the state government ignores its poli（ヅsimpact on the federal
　　tax revenue in each period, differentiating the second-period utility with respect to ｅ and using ⑤
　　ａｎｄ巾a) yields
　　　　　∂Ｗ∂e＝面［→j一瓦（∂ら/∂汗∂乃/紬十配（瓦∂j2/∂汗かｙ［∂た/∂汗∂乃/∂功］
　　　　　　　　＝面［→j－（瓦→2j2×2つ（∂乃/∂○）
　　　Again, applying (11a) to the second expression gives (14a). A similar procedure yields (14b).
　7）lt is difficultto derive general conditions under w^hich the concavity of (13) is ensured. Howev-
　　er,the numerical model in Section 4.2 gives an example of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
　　where the concavity condition is satisfied at least in the neighborhood of the equilibrium.
　8) Without debt / surplus policy, comparing these　equations　and (10a) establishes the standard
　　argument concerning the excessive taxation caused by vertical fiscal competition. To demonstrate,
　　the first-order　condition for the state tax policy is rewritten as
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　一瓦十配（痢十し汁罰）瓦つ一byＴｉＸ/＝0
　　　When this equation is evaluated at the second-best optimum where, む十Ti＝でi，（↓Oa)implies
　　that 一byＴｉＸ/＞0，１ｅａｄｉｎｇto ａ contradiction. This argument shows that, starting from the opti-
　　mum, the state government has　an incentive to increase　its tax rate.（Ａ similar argument applies
　　to the federal tax rate.)
　9) Although the change in £also affects 7レthis change has no welfare impact when tax policy is
　　set according to the first-order conditions in the second period.
10) If∂Ｔ２Ｚ∂eand ∂た/∂£were both negative, it w^ould be that f1/Q1公2/ Q2 <0 and 罰/Q1瓦乃/Q2j0.
　　(One can confirm this by using ａ procedure　similar to the proof of Proposition 3.) Thus, as long
　　as Qi is positive, all the tax rates must be negative, leading to ａ contradiction.
11) In the case　with a finite number of identical states, if the federal public good is pure public in
　　the entire economy, its effective　supply is equal to NGi, where Ｎ　＼ｓthe number of states and Ｇ，
　　now stands for federal expenditure per state.（£in（8b）ａｎｄ（9b）shoｕld be regarded as federal
　　debt per state.) Then, (24b) becomes Bi(Gi) =βへ/ NGi, where a is equal to βへ/‾ｙ‾.
12）Ｔｈｅ value of Ａ，which represents the welfare weight on the private good, was set not to yield
　　extremely high or low tax rates. With respect to the elasticity, any result argued in this subsec-
　　tion carries over　to the cases　with higher　or lower　values　of the elasticity. While my numerical
　　calculation was conducted with respect to が≡［1.1, 2], this paper presents the “intermediate”case
　　ｏｎｌｙ.（Ｔｈｅcalculated outcomes when the elasticity is higher or lower are available upon request.)
13) The value of the elasticity appears not to be crucial to the range a of in which both the levels
　　of government accumulate public surplus. As for η∈［1.1, 2], the largest range is obtained when
　　が≡１．４（?≡［0.6,1.7］). Whenが≡1.9 0r 1.3, the range is α∈［0.7, 1.7］. In other cases, the state
　　and federal governments　choose　public surplus wheno'∈［0.7, 1.6］.
14) As for α二1.7 and a二1.8, federal debt is issued even if∂ら/∂£is positive (but very low). This
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situation arises when federal policy is changing from public surplus to debt. In this case, depend-
ing on the relative and absolute values　of the state and federal tax rates, the federal government
can raise the second-period tax revenue enough to repay the debt issued in the first period while
keeping G2>Gi, even if Ti>T2. But, as federal debt increases　further, the sign of ∂X2/∂E changes
from positive to negative ； see the case　withα= 1.9.
15) Tables l and 3 show that, except for the cases　with a二1.7 0r 1.8, when ａ government chooses
　　public surplus in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, its first-period (second-period) expendi-
　　ture is low (high) relative to the balanced-budget equilibrium. (When public debt is chosen, the
　　opposite ranking holdsﾚ）Ｏｎ the other hand, the first-period (second-period) total public expendi-
　　ture is always lower (higher) in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium than in the balanced-
　　budget　one.
16）Ｔｏ understand how this difference arises, one must look into the first-order conditions for the
　　second-period tax rates. In the case　of consumption taxation, it can be seen, from (20a), that ａ
　　rise in T2 affects z{t2, Tu e) in two different ｍ皿ners :　First, given that ら＞0，ａ rise in 乃
　　increases the marginal benefit of g2（i.ｅ･，配）bｙ reducing the common tax base in the second
　　period. Second, it increases the reciprocal of the marginal cost of public funds of the state
　　ｇｏｖｅｍｍｅｎt，1－削ZQ2，bｙincreasing Q2. Both of these two impacts imply that the parenthesized
　　term of (21a) is positive. In the case　of labor taxation, however, these impacts take the opposite
　　sign each another. The first-order condition for the second-period tax policy, which corresponds to
　　(20a), is
z(t2T2e) = 町
?
１－
j2
-
勿2γ
??＝?????
０
　　　where Wo is the net wage rate, γiｓ the elasticity of labor　supply and j2 and 71 now stand for
　　the labor tax rates. As 7レrises, b2 increases　because　the labor tax base declines, but 1 ―t2rlw2
　　decreases because W2 declines. As ａ result, unlike (21a), the sign of ∂ｚ/∂7いｓnot correlated to the
　　sign of た.
17) Unlike the case　of consumption taxation, the range ｏｆα, where both the levels of government
　　choose surplus in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, quite varies with the value of the
　　elasticity.The range tends to be wider as γΓisｅｓ（?≡［0.6,1.1］if 7 = 0.1; a∈［0.6, 1.2］ifγ
　　＝0.2 ；?≡［0.7, 1.3］ifγ＝0.3；?≡［0.7, 1.4］ifγ＝0.4；?≡［0.7, 1.6］if r=0.5.) In my numerical
　　model where the parameter, α,is attached to the federal public good, the state government issues
　　debt once a deviates from these　ranges. ０ｎ the other hand, the federal government chooses
　　public surplus regardless of the value of α.
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